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Robert Ackrill 
 
This article outlines how the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has evolved, from 
its establishment after the Stresa Conference to the present day. What follows seeks to 
highlight the key binding pressures for policy reform and how they influenced the 
direction taken. In trying to summarise half a century of evolution in a short article, 
choices have had to be made as to which aspects to focus on and what to omit. 
Guidance in this has been taken from two unchanging elements: the formal objectives 
of the CAP (listed in Box 1 in David Stead’s Guest Editorial) and, underpinning these, 
the fundamental principle of providing collective financial support to agriculture. 
 
As a result emphasis is given to transfers from the EU1 budget which, as Figure 1 
shows, have risen persistently over time; and the policy instruments used to direct 
these resources: for, ultimately, the CAP has been run primarily as a policy that has 
channelled financial resources to farmers in order to achieve economic, political and – 
increasingly – environmental, health, safety and welfare goals for or through them. 
Other important issues – such as the impact of the CAP on groups other than EU 
farmers, national budgetary transfers to agriculture and political economy 
explanations of policy formation and change – can, at best, be given only passing 
mention in the present article. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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The output and budget impacts of price support 
As Stead shows in his Editorial, the CAP was established with price support at its 
centre. This supported farmers’ incomes by enabling them to sell their output at prices 
higher than would otherwise prevail. It was known from the outset that the effect on 
output would depend on the price levels set. In the end, they were set high and 
subsequently increased further – even though they barely kept up with very high 
general inflation (Ackrill, 2005: 457-8). Furthermore, whilst all farmers benefited 
from higher prices, only some could boost incomes further by increasing production. 
This group, whilst relatively small in number, subsequently increased output 
considerably, partly through the adoption of advancements in science and technology, 
leading to the now almost-mythical statistic of 80 per cent of support going to 20 per 
cent of farms. (For some production data, see the Parlons Graphiques in this issue.) 
 
The instruments of price support had a major impact on the EU budget. They 
generated revenues via a variable levy on imports, but generated expenditures through 
the need to keep surplus quantities of commodities off EU markets to maintain high 
prices. This spending – on export subsidies and intervention storage – rose as output 
and market imbalances increased (Figure 1). These costs, however, were not borne 
solely by the countries producing the surpluses, but shared by all member states (the 
principle of ‘financial solidarity’). The CAP’s border protection imposed a double 
cost on EU importers, since the price of intra-EU imports was raised above free-trade 
levels (Ackrill et al., 1998). Thus net CAP-related transfers to net exporting countries 
were significantly higher than those to net importing countries (for example Germany 
and the UK), with the latter at the time also typically net contributors to the EU 
budget overall. These factors would later influence national positions on CAP reform. 
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Budgetary pressures for reform 
Persistent surpluses had been present in the EU for some commodities, notably dairy, 
since the 1960s. By the late 1970s, surpluses emerged for other key commodities, 
with self-sufficiency for total cereals and beef exceeding 100 per cent from 1979. This 
drove CAP spending towards its one binding constraint at that time: the balanced 
budget rule on total EU spending. An essential co-requisite for budgetary crisis, 
though, was an amendment to the Treaty of Rome in 1970 which designated CAP 
spending as ‘compulsory’. As a result, expenditure control was possible only via 
changes to expenditure-generating policy instruments. 
 
In order to change the trajectory of CAP spending and ensure the budget balanced, the 
EU needed to reform the CAP. This did not require CAP spending to be cut, just that 
its growth be curtailed. Even so, policy makers faced significant constraints in how 
they could reform the CAP.2 Spending was being driven by rising output, driven in 
turn by prices that far exceeded world market levels. Price cuts sufficient to curtail 
output growth, however, faced enormous political opposition, given the potential 
effect on farm incomes. Furthermore, farmers still opposed direct lump-sum 
payments, the principal alternative to price support, as ‘social handouts’ rather than 
support linked to output and effort (direct payments also reveal more clearly the full 
economic cost of support). 
 
In sugar, however, the CAP had a precedent that preserved the principal structures of 
price support, supplemented by production quotas to control output, if not spending, 
directly. Sugar beet requires processing, offering a channel through which beet must 
pass and, therefore, where production can be controlled. This policy could not easily 
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be extended to all CAP commodities but the immediate budget crisis in 1984, when 
the balanced budget rule was breached, could be addressed by reforming just a single 
sector – dairy. This represented approximately a third of CAP spending and a quarter 
of total EU spending. Most milk output, like sugar, is processed, offering a point 
where production quotas could be imposed. By containing the growth in production, 
growth in expenditure on this sector was contained – without the need to get 
agreement on reductions in support prices. Although the dairy sector had been in 
surplus since the 1960s, previously there had been no binding pressure for reform. 
This arose with the breaching of the balanced budget rule, and a single-sector 
response was feasible because, at the time, the dairy sector dominated CAP spending.3 
 
Throughout the 1980s reform efforts seeking to forestall budgetary crisis were 
directed at other commodities but all sought merely to tweak the existing system of 
price support. Prices were reduced by, at most, only a tiny fraction of the EU-world 
price gap; production incentives and hence budget pressures remained fundamentally 
unaltered. The upwards trajectory of CAP expenditure was thus unaffected, driven by 
spending growth on commodities other than dairy. The 1988 reform included land set-
aside measures but, introduced on a voluntary basis, this failed to alter the trajectory 
of spending. 
 
Trade pressures for reform… 
By the late 1980s, output growth led to a second binding pressure on the CAP. The 
emergence of the EU as a major agricultural exporter, largely on the back of price 
support, created significant tensions between the EU and other agricultural exporters. 
Figure 2 shows, for selected years, EU shares of world exports and imports for key (in 
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budget terms) commodities. The position of dairy and the impact of the 1984 reform 
on export shares are dramatic. Less striking graphically, but crucial in budgetary 
and/or trade terms, is the growth of subsidised exports of cereals, beef and sugar over 
1977-92. 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
[Note, there seems to be two “2005 X” in the legend of this figure, the second pink 
one seems redundant?] 
 
Trade issues came to a head in the Uruguay Round of talks in the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, now part of the WTO). GATT rules permitted limited 
subsidised agricultural exports, but these rules were ambiguous and, ultimately, 
proved unenforceable. The Uruguay Round Agreement preserved agriculture’s 
exception to key trading principles but clarified the terms of that exception. In 
particular, quantitative limits were agreed on the use of export subsidies and on trade-
distorting domestic support. This provided a clearer framework within which national 
policies should operate. 
 
Agreement in the Uruguay Round, however, required CAP reform. In order to make 
the policy less trade-distorting, price support levels had to be reduced significantly. 
Simply reducing prices, however, would have compromised the goal of income 
support: the EU had to alter how the CAP delivered support. The change from price 
support to direct payments, agreed in 1992, focused on the main spending sectors, 
especially arable and beef. In order to attempt to decouple support, that is break the 
link between levels of support and production, the unit values of the payments were 
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fixed and, for arable producers, ‘compulsory’4 set-aside measures were incorporated 
to help to limit production – and thus contain exports and trade-distortion. Figure 2 
shows the impact of these reforms on subsidised exports. Because farmers had to 
continue producing within established commodity areas to qualify for the payments, 
however, the link between support and production was not broken entirely. Whilst set-
aside helped to contain the budgetary and trade-distorting effects of the CAP, the 
wider economic efficiency of the agricultural sector was further compromised, as 
productive inputs were removed from production but mostly retained in the sector 
(neither Various, 1973, nor Barbero et al., 1984, suggest set-aside as a policy option). 
 
Direct payments finally had been accepted, if only out of necessity, reflecting new 
political realities and GATT pressures. More recently, WTO concerns were central to 
shaping the 2003 reform (Swinbank and Daugbjerg, 2006). Here, subject to some 
exceptions, member states agreed to replace the existing direct payments with ‘Single 
Farm Payments’ which, by being further decoupled from production, should reduce 
still further the trade-distorting and inefficiency effects of the CAP. That said, this 
reform did nothing for price support, although the 2006 sugar reform partly addressed 
one of the last major problem sectors in that regard. Overall, though, the EU still 
provides significant support and protection to agriculture (Anderson and Josling, 
2007). 
 
…and the resolution of budget pressures? 
The 1992 shift from commodity price support5 to direct payments reduced the costs 
borne by consumers (as prices paid were reduced), but raised the budget (taxpayer) 
cost as direct payments were phased in: the cost of the latter – borne by the public 
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purse – exceeded the savings on export subsidies and intervention storage. After years 
of reforms motivated by budgetary pressures, it is paradoxical that a reform raised 
budget costs – especially as the balanced budget rule was again threatened in 1992. 
But whereas price support-related expenditures rose persistently as surpluses 
increased, the new payments were fixed in individual and total value. Thus the reform 
led to a one-off rise in spending, since when the budget cost of the CAP has been 
more stable (but see below). Furthermore this reform complemented earlier budgetary 
reforms, where ‘Financial Perspectives’ set in advance for multiple years also 
contributed to EU budgetary restraint. 
 
Not since 1992 has the balanced budget rule been threatened, even though the 1999 
reform, repeating the pattern of 1992, saw prices cut further and direct payments rise. 
Enlargement in 2004 had the potential to destabilise the budget, but an overall 
spending limit was agreed. The EU-15 could have reformed the CAP such that their 
receipts from the policy would have fallen and the policy applied uniformly across the 
EU-25. Instead, they left the policy unchanged, effectively ring-fenced their own 
budget receipts, and set accession terms which imposed on the new members such 
restrictions as necessary to respect the overall budget constraint. Direct payments in 
these countries are being phased in over ten years, and will be of lower unit value than 
in the EU-15 because of lower past yields: a solution only possible because of the 
shift in the basis of support in 1992. Enlargement will thus have an ongoing, but 
controlled, impact on spending. 
 
New policy concerns 
Output-based support has had another impact on policy. The pursuit of quantity, in 
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some cases, compromised quality, safety and the environment. Following various 
human health crises and animal health concerns, attention has been paid increasingly 
to animal, plant and environmental health and the quality and safety of food. These 
issues have not forced reforms in the same way as binding budget constraints or 
international trade commitments: rather, within overarching budgetary and trade 
bounds, this emergent policy concern has influenced where and how the CAP and its 
financial resources are directed. 
 
This shift was perhaps most evident with the 1999 reform, which created the second 
‘Pillar’ of CAP support, rural development. This introduced a clear structure and 
doubling of the related budget (albeit from a low base of about five per cent of total 
CAP spending) for these policy measures. Some of the measures reflect the need to 
continue improving the efficiency of some farms (for example via farm re-
structuring), but now resources are also targeted at measures addressing the new 
multifunctionality agenda (such as promoting agri-environmental initiatives and 
economic diversification of rural economies). Through post-2003 cross-compliance 
obligations, even eligibility for the ‘main’ direct payments is now conditional on 
achieving environmental and welfare goals. Whilst the formal objectives of the CAP 
have remained unchanged since 1957, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty required 
environmental protection to be incorporated into all EU policies; the 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty likewise introduced consumer and animal welfare interests. 
 
The 1999 reform led to other developments in the nature of CAP support. Whilst the 
Pillar II policy framework and core budget allocation are determined collectively, 
member states can choose measures to implement from the policy ‘menu’. It has also 
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seen the first systematic use within the CAP of national co-financing of EU policy 
initiatives (although cynics might suggest this is a way of increasing spending on 
CAP measures within a tight EU budget constraint).6 
 
Overall, as Figure 1 shows, the growth in CAP spending has slowed, but not reversed 
in nominal terms. The effect of those reforms implemented to reflect GATT/WTO 
priorities can also be seen in Figure 3, showing total CAP percentage Producer and 
Consumer Support Estimates (PSE/CSE). These present the shares of producer 
receipts and consumer spending attributable to agricultural support policies (with the 
CSE expressed as a negative number). There has been a modest fall in the PSE as 
CAP support has been steadily decoupled. With the shift away from price support, 
however, the CSE has fallen significantly.7 The structural changes in CAP spending, 
as described above, are depicted in Figure 4. 
 
[FIGURE 3 & FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Farmers and CAP reform 
CAP reform has not been without opposition. Since the introduction of dairy quotas, 
farmers have often opposed precisely those changes ultimately agreed by politicians. 
This author has thus long-questioned the idea of a closed agricultural ‘policy 
community’ shaping the CAP. Given that, along with the objectives of the CAP, 
levels of spending have been sustained it is perhaps more appropriate to think of a 
budgetary policy community. This will include agricultural interests (farmers 
continue to be the main target for financial transfers), but also wider fiscal and 
political constituencies, for whom preserving national transfers from the EU budget is 
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of profound political significance. 
 
Indeed, regardless of the reforms implemented, until the 2004 enlargement the 
distribution of spending across countries remained remarkably stable. Price support 
established a pattern of transfers that favoured larger farms and net-exporting member 
states. Subsequent reforms changed the basis of support towards direct payments, but 
based payment size and entitlement on either price cuts and losses incurred (in 1992), 
or on previous payment receipts (in 2003). The result has been a system that has 
continued to direct most money to the largest and, arguably, most efficient and 
affluent farmers.8 Even with member states now required to ‘modulate’ some of their 
payments – that is, to top-slice a small percentage and recycle it into rural 
development measures – most of the money modulated must remain in the ‘home’ 
country (for a broader analysis, see Ackrill and Kay, 2006). 
 
A final issue to address in this article is the question of farming incomes. The 
observation was made above regarding the centrality to the CAP of financial transfers 
seeking to achieve the Treaty objective of a ‘fair standard of living for…persons 
engaged in agriculture’. Despite this, there is such a lack of adequate data on farm and 
off-farm incomes that ‘it is not possible to describe and monitor the incomes of 
farmers and their families, to show how many of them receive low incomes that may 
place them in poverty, and to distinguish between those that…temporarily have low 
or negative incomes and the smaller core where the situation is endemic’ (Hill, 2008: 
12). 
 
More problematically, there is a lack of demand for better statistics. In particular, 
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Eurostat data ‘showed farmers as a group in most EU-15 countries [at the turn of the 
millennium] to have average incomes broadly on a par with those of households in 
general in the same country (except for Portugal). This finding did nothing to further 
political support for the statistics, at least among agricultural households.’ (Ibid: 15.) 
Other concerns Hill notes include farming groups, in some countries, opposing the 
publication of data showing members’ total incomes; and variations in farmers’ total 
incomesdifferent countries undermining the ‘national interest’ in political debates. 
 
The nature of policy support can also affect whether the ultimate beneficiaries are 
‘persons engaged in agriculture’ or, for example, the owners of factors of production 
other than labour, notably land; although an analysis of this is beyond the scope of the 
present article. Overall, the CAP still does not emphasise individual income needs 
when determining policy disbursements (see also Allanson, 2008). Indeed, with such 
a paucity of data, this is not surprising – even though income needs have been the 
primary justification for CAP transfers for most of the last fifty years. A recent 
discussion with a senior Commission official revealed that, in their opinion, the big 
issue facing the CAP today was what exactly the member states want to achieve from 
direct payments (now the dominant form of budgetary support). This, it is to be 
hoped, will be a central part of the ‘Health Check’ (see elsewhere in this issue). 
 
The puzzle, however, is why it has taken so long to ask this basic question – and how 
long it might be before data are provided to allow for answers to be given and policy 
change implemented. Moreover, if farm income problems and the wider policy 
concerns discussed above are to be tackled, the cross-country, cross-farm size and 
cross-commodity distributions of CAP spending will have to change, despite 
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considerable political opposition to the redistribution of EU funds that would be 
needed to achieve the broader agenda now expected of the CAP. 
 
Notes 
1 ‘EU’ is used throughout for simplicity, although in the past this entity was known as, 
inter alia, the European Communities. 
2 Economists, critical of the efficiency and welfare impacts of the CAP, have long 
debated policy reform and possible directions. What is interesting about, for example, 
Various (1973) and Barbero et al. (1984) is that many of the measures proposed were 
introduced, albeit a long time later. This suggests timing matters for policy reform as 
much as the ‘objective’ merits of economic arguments. 
3 Subsequent quota cuts meant that dairy became the only sector to experience a 
sustained fall in the absolute level of nominal spending. 
4 Strictly speaking, set-aside was not compulsory, but if ‘large’ farmers did not set-
aside land, they would not receive direct payments. 
5 Key institutional prices were cut, notably the intervention price, at which surpluses 
were bought by national authorities and which, in a situation of over-supply, 
represented more or less a floor price for the market. As this was cut so over-supply 
drove down market prices. 
6 It is a moot point whether this constitutes re-nationalisation of the CAP. I believe it 
does not, as the agenda, specific measures and core budget are determined 
collectively. Time will reveal how this approach to policy develops. 
7 The PSE and CSE are not the only alternative indicators of agricultural support. See, 
inter alia, Anderson and Josling (2007); Legg (2007). 
8 Analogously, the arable and beef sectors have remained the costliest under the CAP. 
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Figure 1: Total EU spending and CAP Guarantee spending, 1965-2006 (million 
units of common currency; percentage share) 
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Source: European Commission, Financial Report 2006; own calculations. 
Note: Guarantee expenditures traditionally focused on income support measures. 
Since the 1999 reform, some rural development measures also fall under this heading. 
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Figure 2: The changing EU shares of world agricultural exports (X) and imports 
(M), selected commodities and years 
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Sources: European Commission (various years), Agricultural Situation in the 
Community; Agricultural Situation in the European Union. 
Note: ‘Milk powder’ includes whole and skimmed. 
 
[NB: THE SECOND ‘2005 X’ LABEL IN THE LEGEND NEEDS DELETING IN 
THE PUBLISHED VERSION, PLEASE]
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Figure 3: Total EU percentage Producer and Consumer Support Estimates, 
1986-2006 
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Source: The OECD PSE/CSE database, available online at: www.oecd.org. 
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Figure 4: The changing structure of total CAP spending, 1992 and 2006 
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Sources: 1992 – based on data from the Court of Auditors Annual Report for 1992, 
OJ C309, 16 November 1993; 2006 – European Commission, Financial Report 2006. 
Note: 1992 ‘Rural Development’ spending is actually EAGGF Guidance section 
expenditures, included for approximate comparative purposes. 
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1. Colour photograph of red crop sprayer. 
Caption:  
Photograph © European Community. 
[IF THERE IS NOT ROOM FOR FOUR PHOTOGRAPHS, BUT ONLY THREE, 
PLEASE COULD THIS BE THE ONE OMITTED] 
 
2. Colour photograph of grass and red flowers: 
Caption: 
Photograph © European Community. 
 
3. Colour portrait of MacSharry. 
Caption: 
Ray MacSharry, European Commissioner for Agriculture at the time of the 1992 CAP 
reform. Photograph © European Community. 
 
4. Black and white photo of protesting Irish farmers. 
Caption: 
Irish milk producers demonstrating in Brussels in 1984. Photograph © European 
Community. 
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Summary 
In the fifty years since the Stresa Conference, the CAP has undergone many changes. 
Its presence, however, has been one of the most prominent and constant features of 
the ‘European project’. This article outlines how the policy has changed and identifies 
the key pressures driving that change, in the context of unchanging formal objectives 
for the policy. Having established price support as the primary means of supporting 
farm incomes, crucial elements of the EU budget process then combined with rising 
production and surpluses to put the CAP on a path that led inexorably to financial 
crisis. As the EU began to deal with these pressures, so price support was already 
taking the policy towards another pressure point – growing subsidised exports and, 
ultimately, clashes in the GATT over trade-distorting policies and their effects on 
other countries. In the reforms since 1992, designed to address both budget and trade 
concerns, the direction the policy has taken has also been influenced by newly-
emerging issues, notably the welfare and health of the environment, animals and 
consumers. Yet despite all these changes and the vast sums spent, the extent to which 
the farm income problem has been resolved remains unclear. Despite the centrality of 
income concerns to the CAP, data on farm household incomes remain limited – and 
there exists considerable political opposition to changing this situation. 
 
Pullquote 
“Despite all the changes to the CAP and the vast sums spent, the extent to which the 
farm income problem has been resolved remains unclear”. 
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